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Abstract 
 
Despite the common defamation of the states’ rights theories acted upon in the 
Nullification Crisis of 1832, there exists a great deal of historical support for the 
nullifiers’ positions. Nullifiers believed in a decentralized constitutional system, while 
nationalists believed in a centralized constitutional system. This tension between central 
and decentralized positions had been at issue in the American struggle for independence 
though the exact manner in which these problems manifested themselves was different in 
the two events. The states’ rights ideas championed primarily by John C. Calhoun were 
consistent with American political tradition. At the most basic level, the Nullification 
Crisis was over a disparity between constitutional interpretations. However, a 
demonstration of the existence of such issues in the American Revolution and the 
implications of those forces on the early republic demonstrate that the Nullifiers’ 
positions were consistent with history and traditional American resistance to centralized 
power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE NULLIFIERS AND HISTORY                                                                              4 
 
 “Historically as Certain as Our Revolution Itself”: The Nullifiers and History 
 
Few today have taken the doctrines of nullification championed by John C. 
Calhoun seriously. Modern scholarship tends to dismiss the strong states rights position 
adopted by the South as mere contrivances designed to protect slavery, and the 1860s saw 
the violent repudiation of such doctrines. Violence nearly erupted thirty years earlier in 
1833 when most of the political establishment arrayed itself against Calhoun and the 
South Carolina nullifiers. However, a fair and careful historical analysis of Calhoun’s 
argument reveals that the nullifiers acted reasonably and logically in accordance with 
historical precedents established during the war for independence. As a result any critique 
should focus on the nullifier’s perception of their situation, abstract questions of political 
science, or the mere practicality of Calhoun’s proposed system.  
A great deal of continuity and similarity exists between the American struggle for 
independence and the Nullification Crisis of 1832. While independence mainly involved 
questions of sovereignty, in both a disparity of constitutional interpretations centered on 
questions of where exactly sovereignty resided in the constitutional system and whether a 
centralized unitary system or a dispersed system existed. In England during the 1760s and 
1770s, most believed Parliament to be sovereign and that a unitary nation of some sort 
existed under the sovereignty of that parliament and was represented in it. The colonies, 
however, were in the process of developing a view of the English Constitution that was 
much more federal in nature. Thus, there was a direct conflict between a decentralized 
and consolidated vision of the empire. A similar disparity of constitutional interpretation 
came to a head in the Nullification Crisis of 1832 when South Carolina acted upon a 
decentralized conception of the Union in response to centralizing tendencies.  
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A definitional diversion must be made before beginning in earnest. Donald 
Livingston, Professor Emeritus at Emory University, identified “two ideal conceptions of 
legitimate political order,” from the early modern era.1 The first and pre-dominant one he 
refers to as “Hobbesian” or the “modern unitary state,” and the other he calls the 
“Althusian” or the “modern federated polity.” The first model is “composed of 
egotistically motivated individuals who contract to form a sovereign office to rule for the 
sake of peace and stability.” Though, Livingston refers to the first model as “Hobbesian” 
after Thomas Hobbs’ exposition of such a theory in Leviathan (1651), he intends the term 
as a broad label. For example, Livingston includes Locke’s political theory under this 
label as well because, despite the libertarian flavor, Locke propounded the same basic 
system Hobbs did. For Livingston any system that supposes man began in a state of 
nature and contracted to create society, government, and sovereignty falls into this broad 
category. “Hobbesian” serves as a convenient label for consolidated, centralized, unitary 
systems not merely the version of it propounded by Hobbes. The second model, named 
for Johannes Althusius, author of a treatise on political theory entitled Politica “root[s] 
political order… in social bonds and duties.” It conceives of sovereignty as a “symbiotic 
relation among… independent social orders.” This system believes society to exist 
independent of and prior to government. Sovereignty then is vested in the societies that 
create government.2 These two positions are drastically different in both presuppositions 
and implications. The Hobbesian model consolidates power in a sovereign center, while 
the Althusian model disperses power throughout the component parts of a polity or 
system of polities. These two fundamental positions manifested themselves in the 
                                            
1
 Donald W. Livingston, "The very Idea of Secession," Society 35, no. 5 (July 1998), 38. 
   
2
 Ibid., 38.  
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disparate constitutional positions of the 1770s and 1830s, and these positions will be 
referred to in these terms.  
In July of 1776, thirteen colonies denounced their monarch and separated 
themselves from the British Empire. This was no sudden action; a decade long debate 
regarding the power of Parliament and the very nature of the British Empire preceded it. 
Over the course of this debate American views shifted from a carefully defined 
subordination to Parliament to an understanding of the Empire as a system of confederate 
polities. Ultimately, this contest of strength among parts of the empire convinced 
colonists of designs against their liberties and climaxed in the Declaration of 
Independence.   
 An example of constitutional contest occurred in Massachusetts during 1762. A 
dispute arose between the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Massachusetts’s 
Royal Governor Francis Bernard. In response to reports of a privateer endangering 
Massachusetts fishing vessels, Governor Bernard outfitted a war ship and informed the 
House of his actions when they came in session. The House of Representatives did not 
condone the Governor’s actions, as he expected; rather they censured him. The thrust of 
their argument was that he had acted unconstitutionally in outfitting a ship and allocating 
funds to defray the expenses of the expedition without the consent of the House of 
Representatives. A line from the censure read, “It is in effect taking from the house their 
most darling privilege, the right of originating all Taxes.”3 It later added a rhetorical 
flourish: “for it would be of little consequence to the people whether they were subject to 
George or Lewis, the King of Great Britain or the French King, if both were arbitrary, as 
                                            
3
 James Otis, A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of the 
Massachusetts-Bay: More Particularly, in the Last Session of the General Assembly (Boston: Edes & Gill 
in Queen St, 1762), 7.  
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both would be if both could levy Taxes without Parliament.”4 Governor Bernard 
eventually dismissed the legislature before the argument had been settled. Choosing not 
to wait till the next House session to continue the argument, Representative James Otis 
wrote a tract entitled A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the 
Province of the Massachusetts-Bay.  
The argument, both in session and in Otis’s pamphlet, revealed several things. 
First was the obvious fear of arbitrary power. The official censure of the government 
explicitly stated that fear of arbitrary power motivated House jealousy over finances: 
“And when once the representatives of a people give up this privilege, the government 
will very soon become arbitrary.”5 Otis concluded that because the House had the power 
to tax, there existed an implicit limit upon the Governor and Council’s ability to use 
money in the treasury. He asserted that a House Act specifically permitting spending was 
necessary for the Governor or Council to use public money.6 A Vindication demonstrated 
that the colonists held strong opinions regarding the power of their assemblies to tax and 
defended those rights against intrusions of arbitrary power.  
 Second, A Vindication demonstrated the high regard colonists had for the King. 
Otis asserted that, “the British constitution as now established in his Majesty’s person and 
family, is the wisest and best in the world.”7 He continued, “The King of Great-Britain is 
the best as well as most glorious Monarch upon the Globe, and his subjects the happiest 
                                            
4
 Ibid., 7.  
 
5
 Ibid., 7. 
 
6
 Ibid., 16. 
 
7
 Ibid.,10. 
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in the universe.”8 This was not mere rhetoric; professor of history at Boston University 
Brendan McConville observed that the colonies were far more enthusiastic in their 
loyalty to the King than the people of England were.9 Third, A Vindication provided 
insight into Otis’s view of the constitutional position of the colonies within the empire. 
Speaking of what he believed to be the “last resort” for a colonial assembly when conflict 
arises with the governor, Otis wrote, “I mean as we are a dependent government, a dutiful 
and humble remonstrance to his Majesty.”10 This statement acknowledges the supremacy 
of the Crown and Parliament over the colonies. He asserted that Parliament alone had the 
right to an “appeal to Heaven, and the longest sword” when the King overstepped his 
bounds.11 However, he also articulated a view of the colonial assemblies as parallel to 
Parliament within their jurisdiction.12 The colonists understood the governor as the 
King’s agent, his council as an equivalent to the House of Lords, and colonial assemblies 
as equivalent to the House of Commons. 13 Just as the commons did in England, the 
houses controlled the purse strings in the colonies, and both bodies acted as checks on the 
King’s prerogative as exercised through the governor. It was only a matter of time before 
the view of colonial assemblies as analogous to Parliament expanded to include the right 
to armed opposition against usurpations of their power, or as Otis phrased it, “an appeal 
to “the longest sword.”  
                                            
8
 Ibid.,10. 
 
9
 Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 76-80. 
 
10
 James Otis, A Vindication, 17. 
 
11
 Ibid., 17. 
 
12
 Ibid., 23. 
 
13
 Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of 
the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1986), 31.  
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While those like Otis saw legislative checks on the governor as a positive thing, 
some in the colonies and most in England believed that the assemblies were the branches 
of government that were overreaching. They believed that the lower houses existed at the 
king’s pleasure and need not exist to maintain the rights of the colonists. Thus, an 
assembly that managed to limit the governor had not checked power but rather usurped 
Royal prerogative.14 It was widely believed that the assemblies had limited power and 
were to function as an organ for internal management of the colonies, but that the will of 
the king in counsel was the law for the colonies.15 These interpretational issues that had 
been limited to small debates between assemblies and colonial governors would be taken 
to another dimension in the mid 1760’s when the debate between the colonies and 
Parliament began.  
 The grand constitutional debate began in earnest when, in response to the Stamp 
Act, many of the colonies sent representatives to what has been named the Stamp Act 
Congress. This congress produced the Declaration of Rights (1765), which expressed 
similar themes as those in Otis’s Vindication. The first point of the declaration pledged 
allegiance to king and “all due subordination to that august body, the Parliament of Great 
Britain,” demonstrating widespread loyalty toward the king and recognition of 
Parliamentary supremacy.16 In subsequent points the delegates constructed an argument 
against the Stamp Act grounded in the right of Englishmen not to be taxed without their 
consent. The third points states, “That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a 
                                            
14
 Ibid., 33.  
 
15
 Ibid., 53. Greene recounts a less intense Constitutional debate that occurred throughout the 
1750s. In this debate many of these positions were articulated and the lines were drawn but left untested for 
later debate.  
 
16
 The Declaration of Rights of the Stamp Act Congress, Stamp Act Congress, 1765. 
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people, and the undoubted rights of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on 
them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their representatives.”17 Here in 
almost as many words is the remembered rallying cry of the Revolution: “No taxation 
without representation.”  
The language of this document brings to mind the argument James Otis expressed 
a year earlier in The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved (1764). In this 
pamphlet Otis allowed that the colonies were “subject to and dependent on Great Britain; 
and that therefore as over subordinate governments, the parliament of Great-Britain has 
an undoubted power and lawful authority to make acts for the general good.”18 
Continuing, he asserted, “The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his 
property, without his consent in person, or by representation.”19 Otis concluded that it is 
entirely unjust for Parliament to tax the colonies, as they are not represented in that body 
and “if a man is not his own assessor in person, or by deputy, his liberty is gone, or lay 
entirely at the mercy of others.”20 Both of these documents acknowledged Parliamentary 
supremacy over the colonies and a right to general legislation, but also explicitly denied 
the power of Parliament to tax the colonies, as that was an explicit violation of the right 
of an individual to give consent to taxes in person or by a representative.  
 The British of course disagreed with this assertion of colonial rights. Though 
forced to repeal the Stamp Act, Parliament expressed in the Declaratory Act its opinion 
on the colonial assemblies’ exclusive right to taxation. The act states that the colonial 
                                            
17
 Ibid.  
 
18
 James Otis, The Rights of British Colonists Asserted and Proved (Boston: Edes & Gill, in Queen 
Street, 1764), 17.  
 
19
 Ibid., 20.  
 
20
 Ibid., 21. 
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legislatures’ claims were illegal. It also argued that the various “votes, resolutions, and 
orders, derogatory to the legislative authority of parliament” were inconsistent with 
colonial “dependence” upon Britain.21 The Act’s titular declaration asserts that the king 
and Parliament had full authority “to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and 
validity to bind the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great 
Britain, in all cases whatsoever.”22  
 Parliament rested its claim to power over the colonies upon the theory of virtual 
representation as articulated by Thomas Whateley a year before the Stamp Act’s 
adoption. Whateley, a Parliamentary deputy of Lord Greeneville, prepared a book length 
argument for virtual representation in order to head off questions regarding the legitimacy 
of Parliamentary measures to raise internal revenues in the colonies, prior the passage of 
the Stamp Act.23 This is the source of the basic argument that the colonists were in fact 
represented in Parliament in the same manner any non-voting Englishmen was 
represented in Parliament: 
The Fact is, that the Inhabitants of the Colonies are represented in Parliament; 
they do not indeed choose the Members of that Assembly; neither are Nine Tenths 
of the People of Britain Electors… All British Subjects are really in the same; 
none are actually, all are virtually represented in Parliament; for every Member of 
Parliament sits in the House, not as Representative of his own Constituents, but as 
one of the august Assembly by which all the Commons of Great Britain are 
represented… but as it is, they and the Colonies and all British Subjects whatever, 
have an equal Share in the general Representation of the Commons of Great 
Britain, and are bound by the Consent of the Majority of that House, whether their 
                                            
21
 An Act for the Better Securing the Dependency of His Majesty’s Dominion in America upon the 
Crown and Parliament of Great Britain, 1766, 10 Geo. 3, c. 12. 
 
22
 Ibid. 
 
23
 Jack Greene, Peripheries and Center, 80-81.  
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own particular Representatives consented to or opposed the Measure there taken, 
or whether they had not particular Representatives there.24 
 
This constitutional interpretation of the empire and the rules of Parliament in turn rested 
upon a conception of the English Empire as a unitary nation state.  
 That virtual representation rested upon a unitary state model is no mere 
summation. Whateley, earlier in his book, explicitly stated as much: “The British Empire 
in Europe and in America is still the same Power: Its subjects in both are still the same 
People: and all equally participate in the Adversity or Prosperity of the whole.”25  He 
argued that the colonies and Britain shared mutual interests thus implying the existence 
of a single community with a single government. He stated, “It is an indisputable 
Consequence of their being thus one Nation, that they must be governed by the same 
supreme Authority, be subject to one executive Power in the King, to one legislative 
Power in the Parliament of Great-Britain.”26 Finally, he concluded, “Their Connection 
would otherwise be an Alliance, not a Union; and they would be no longer one State, but 
a Confederacy of many.”27 No clearer declaration of a Hobbesian concept of the state is 
possible. Clearly, Parliament was approaching the constitutional debate from a 
consolidated, unitary-state perspective.  
 Though, they acknowledged Parliamentary supremacy, colonists balked at the 
Stamp Act and the theories used attempting to justify it. This is because, while 
acknowledging their own dependent status, they maintained claims on certain rights that 
                                            
24
 Thomas Whateley, The Regulations Lately Made Concerning the Colonies and Taxes Imposed 
upon Them, Considered (London, 1765), 107-109.  
 
25
 Ibid., 39. 
 
26
 Ibid., 40. 
 
27
 Ibid., 40.  
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served to limit Parliamentary supremacy. Chief amongst these was the right to be taxed 
only by their own representatives. While an individual right, it could only exist if 
“collective” or community rights were protected, because as colonists saw it, they were 
represented only in their local assemblies. For the colonists, this essentially meant that 
their assemblies’ sole powers of taxation had to be maintained, because allowing 
Parliamentary taxation was equivalent to surrendering liberty due to the lack of colonial 
representation in that body. This demonstrates the interplay between two principles, the 
first being that representation was necessary to taxation, the second being that separate 
communities existed. The emphasis colonists placed upon their collective rights 
embodied in their legislatures clearly indicates that Whateley’s arguments regarding the 
unitary nature of the empire were not accepted in the colonies. This disparity of 
interpretation served as a frame for future struggles pitching the community rights of the 
colonies against the claims of Parliament.28 
 Round two of the debate came after Parliament passed the Townshend Acts in 
another attempt to raise revenue in the colonies. In his Letters From a Farmer in 
Pennsylvania John Dickinson argued against the right to Parliamentary taxation of the 
colonies while allowing Parliamentary supremacy. Discussing the Townshend duties, he 
said, “the Parliament unquestionably possesses a legal authority to regulate the trade of 
Great Britain, and all her colonies.”29 He believed such authority was necessary and 
dismissed any arguments to the contrary. Dickinson wrote that Parliament had a right to 
regulate trade and that the incidental raising of revenue through duties designed to 
                                            
28
 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of 
the War of American Independence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 161-163. 
 
29
 John Dickinson, “Letter II,” in Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania 
Farmer, Letters from the Federal Farmer, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), 7.  
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regulate was not a violation of rights. However, he affirmed the illegality of taxation 
without representation.30 Observing that the Townshend Acts were designed specifically 
to raise revenue, Dickinson stated, “This I call an innovation: and a most dangerous 
innovation.”31 He believed it so dangerous because it was a blatant attempt to raise 
revenue without the consent of those taxed. Dickinson grounded the principle of no 
taxation without representation in the traditional understanding of taxes as a free gift of 
the people to their sovereign. With this foundation established he affirmed the sixth point 
of the Stamp Act Congress Declaration of Resolves: “it is unreasonable, and inconsistent 
with the principles and spirit of the British constitution, for the people of Great Britain to 
grant to his Majesty the property of the colonies.”32 There is an implicit distinction 
between the “people of Great Britain” and the “colonies.” The “colonies” must mean the 
people or peoples of the colonies. The English Parliament was unable to tax the colonies 
because the tax was no longer a free gift of the people if another people coerced it from 
them. Dickinson’s letters articulate essentially the same view of the colonies that Otis did 
in 1762, but the continued debate was on the verge of causing a significant shift in 
thinking.  
 These arguments fostered a belief that the Empire was a system of confederated 
polities. Though less popular, some held to the confederated polities view as early as the 
1760s. It had risen to prominence by the 1770s. 33 Normally considered a nationalist, even 
                                            
30
 Ibid., 7-9. 
 
31
 Ibid., 10.  
 
32
 John Dickinson, “Letter IV,” in Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania 
Farmer, Letters from the Federal Farmer, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), 23. 
 
33
 Jack Greene, Peripheries and Center, 134-136. John, McConville, The King’s Three Faces, 204. 
John McConville notes that some had held this view as early as the first decade of the 1700s. 
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Alexander Hamilton expressed such an opinion in his “The Farmer Refuted.” He argued 
that there was a right to self-government: “for civil liberty cannot possibly have any 
existence where the society for whom laws are made have no share in making them.”34 
His use of the word society here is another indicator of the colonial American emphasis 
upon community rather than strictly the individual. By a detailed examination of the 
various colonial charters and former colonial interactions with Parliament, Hamilton 
argued that the colonies were “entirely discordant with that sovereignty of Parliament.”35 
Elsewhere he claimed that, “ the voice of nature, the spirit of the British constitution, and 
the charters of the colonies in general” opposed parliamentary supremacy over the 
colonies.36 The one allowance made for Parliamentary authority was the right to regulate 
external trade. His veneration for custom necessitated this concession, as the colonies had 
permitted such actions since the Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century. Ultimately 
his position was that the British Empire consisted of a multiplicity of polities united in a 
common sovereign but independent of one another in regard to internal affairs.  
 Jefferson articulated a very similar conception of the British Empire in his 
Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774). He argues that the original 
settlers of the American colonies had acted upon the basic human right to emigration and 
had established new societies in the wilds of North America separate from England.37 
                                            
34
 Alexander Hamilton, “The Farmer Refuted,” in The Revolutionary Writings of Alexander 
Hamilton, ed. Richard B. Vernier, 1775, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2121/164944 (accessed October 27, 2013).  
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 Ibid.  
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 Ibid.  
 
37
 Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America (Williamsburg, 1774), 5-7. 
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These societies, presumed Jefferson, were under no obligation to maintain associations 
with England:  
[but] the emigrants thought proper to adopt that system of laws under which they 
had hitherto lived in the mother country, and to continue their union with her by 
submitting themselves to the same common sovereign, who was thereby made the 
central link connecting the several parts of the empire thus newly multiplied.38 
 
Elsewhere in his pamphlet, Jefferson refered to both Parliament and colonial legislatures 
as “free and independent legislature[s].”39 He also spoke of “the addition of new states to 
the British Empire [producing] an addition of new, and sometimes opposite interests;” he 
saw it as the King’s duty to act as a mediator between these interests.40 More significantly 
the assertion of separate interests further supports the distinct nature of the multiple 
polities constituting the British Empire. Building on the concept of multiple communities 
existing within the British Empire, he asserted that, “from the nature of things, every 
society must at all times possess within itself the sovereign powers of legislation.”41 
Jefferson concluded by arguing that the King was in fact the servant of the people in 
whom real sovereignty actually resided and calling upon the King to act as a fair 
mediator between the different peoples of the empire.42 
 Hamilton and especially Jefferson articulated in these documents a theory of the 
British Empire that was thoroughly Althusian. As they saw it, each colony was equal to 
Britain and the empire was a sort of federated polity joined by a single executive power 
in the King. This stands in stark and obvious contrast to the position of empire articulated 
                                            
38
 Ibid., 7. 
 
39
 Ibid., 12 
 
40
 Ibid., 16 
 
41
 Ibid., 19.  
 
42
 Ibid., 22-23.  
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by Whateley in 1765. The years of debate caused Americans to fully develop an 
Althusian position, and though this thoroughly federal view had to develop, the fact that 
it did develop logically from previously held positions suggests that the colonists had 
never been too fundamentally Hobbesian in their thinking. The underpinning belief that 
led Americans to accept this anti-Hobbesian theory of empire was that a people held 
certain powers upon which no other entity may infringe. Thus, their earliest rejection of 
Parliamentary taxation was an indication that they believed themselves different political 
communities, the seed of the fully developed Althusian conceptions presented by 
Hamilton and Jefferson.43 In such a view, the recent Parliamentary incursions against 
colonial legislatures were completely unjustifiable.  
 The proliferation of the interpretation that placed colonial assemblies on par with 
Parliament ensured a continued struggle. It is critical to understand that there had been a 
shift in constitutional organization after the Glorious Revolution that was not embraced in 
the colonies. When Parliament replaced the king in the Glorious Revolution a precedent 
of Parliamentary supremacy was set. In English eyes Parliament assumed all prerogatives 
formerly held by the king. Thus Parliament now had every right to legislate for the 
colonies.44 The colonists however, never accepted Parliamentary supremacy and 
maintained a remarkable attachment to the king.45 In fact, the colonies held very high 
views of the king throughout the entire colonial period and appealed to him to protect 
                                            
43
 Hamilton of course in the national period was the ardent nationalist and champion of a 
Hobbesian vision for America. However, the theory he articulated in “The Farmer Refuted” is quite 
Althusian in nature.  
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45
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them from the overreaching Parliament. The Declaration of Rights of the Stamp Act 
Congress began, “The members of this congress, sincerely devoted, with the warmest 
sentiments of affection and duty to His Majesty’s person and government, inviolably 
attached to the present happy establishment of the Protestant succession.”46 The Olive 
Branch Petition addressed George III as “Most Gracious Sovereign,” and described the 
colonists as “Your majesty’s most faithful subjects.”47 Though, to a degree these are 
stock phrases, their sincerity is suggested by the extremely high view of the king held by 
most colonists. The colonies had even come to hold a sort of “neodivine right” view of 
the king.48 While he was understood to have limits on his prerogative, the king was 
thought of as the Lord’s anointed and somewhat above mere men.49 A belief in the divine 
appointment of the king helped maintain his high esteem and perceived superiority to 
Parliament.50 This veneration of the king undoubtedly helped with the proliferation of an 
Althusian view of imperial organization.  
 While historians can see that it was this dichotomy of constitutional interpretation 
that led to the war, colonists came to see the situation as more than a legal debate. Since 
colonist held that the king was at the top of the imperial institutional structure, they could 
not conceive of a justification for Parliamentary intervention in their affairs.  The 
colonists’ deep seated fear of arbitrary power predisposed them to interpret the continued 
attempts by Parliament to tax and legislate for the colonies as a deliberate attempt to 
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usurp authority, rather than the outworking of constitutional changes begun by the 
Glorious Revolution. 51  
The Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (1775) plainly 
articulates such a belief: “The legislature of Great-Britain … stimulated by an inordinate 
passion for a power not only unjustifiable, but what they know to be peculiarly 
reprobated by the very constitution of that kingdom… attempted to effect their cruel and 
impolitic purpose of enslaving these colonies by violence.”52 Clearly for the colonists, the 
struggle moved past a mere legal debate. The Declaration includes a list of offenses such 
as unjust taxation and the abolishment of trial by jury as evidence of Parliament’s 
dastardly designs. It took greatest issue with the Declaratory Act because of its claims of 
absolute power over the colonies.53 The colonists clearly believed that the Parliament was 
trying to infringe upon American liberties.  
However, even after the colonists had taken up arms against the army in Boston, 
reconciliation was still desired. The colonists took a strong stance, but promised, “we 
assure them that we mean not to dissolve that union which has so long and so happily 
subsisted between us, and which we sincerely wish to see restored.”54 The colonists saw 
themselves as having to choose between, “an unconditional submission to the tyranny of 
irritated ministers, or resistance by force.”55 This document clearly revealed a colonial 
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belief in a deliberate Parliamentarian effort to destroy liberty in the colonies, but loyalty 
to the king had not yet been shaken.  
The patriots, while intent upon defending their rights, did not seek independence 
before, to their horror, they became convinced of the king’s complicity in the conspiracy. 
His support of the Quebec Act, which established Catholicism in Quebec, was very 
troubling to the vociferously anti-Catholic, Protestant colonies. The historical context of 
Catholic Stuart tyranny and Catholic Jacobite conspiracies caused colonists to see this act 
as a dangerous flirtation with Catholicism and tyranny.56 However, the final straw came 
when the king considered his colonies to be in rebellion and employed “foreign 
mercenaries” to subject them while they still beseeched him for protection.57 Convinced 
that the king had joined with Parliament to usurp power and destroy liberty, the colonies 
finally resorted to independence as they could conceive of no other way to preserve their 
freedoms and rights. The Americans expressed their belief that the King-in-Parliament 
had violated their constitutional rights in the Declaration of Independence.58 The 
Declaration states, “When a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the 
same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it 
is their duty, to throw off such government.”59 The colonists firmly believed that such 
was their situation and listed myriad complaints against the king in the Declaration of 
Independence.  
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Independence from Britain did not bring with it consensus on constitutional 
order.60 Rather, Hobbesian and Althusian conceptions of political order continued to be 
pitted against each other. These two views waxed and waned in power as they struggled 
against each other. During the early national period led by Hamilton, a centralized 
conception of the union was ascendant. The Federalist implementation of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts gave opportunity for a reassertion of Althusian doctrines. Though no other 
states adopted them, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 along with the 
subsequent Virginia Report articulated a conception of union consistent with the 
Althusian order described in Jefferson’s Summary View of the Rights of British America. 
Though there are some exceptions, the presidency of Jefferson ushered in a time when 
the Althusian conception as articulated in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions was 
dominant. However, the Supreme Court propagated nationalistic policies throughout the 
period, especially in the eighteen-teens. In the 1820’s with the election of John Quincy 
Adams and the increase of federally funded internal improvements, nationalism again 
seemed to be dominating.  
In response to nationalistic policies, a significant distrust of the central 
government grew steadily in the south during the 1820s. The internal improvements 
pushed during the Adams administration and nationalist decisions of the Marshall court 
convinced many that the Constitution had become meaningless and that the federal 
government would now do whatever it pleased.61 During this time, the south, was 
becoming especially nervous of northern intentions and came to conceive of the north as 
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a permanent majority bent on using the south for its own economic aggrandizement.62 
The implementation of high tariffs in 1828 and 1832 convinced many in South Carolina 
that centralization had gone too far. These attitudes of distrust and apprehension 
prompted action. Though there were a multitude of leaders in the South Carolina 
nullification movement, among them Thomas Cooper, George McDuffie, and William 
Smith, the most prominent of these was John C. Calhoun. Calhoun was Jackson’s Vice 
President until 1832, immediately before the nullification of the tariffs, and was 
immediately elected Senator upon his resignation of the Vice Presidency. As the greatest 
articulator and political theorist of the nullification movement, Calhoun authored an 
official enumeration of grievances and a plan for nullification passed as resolutions by 
the South Carolina legislature.63 Clarifying his positions and adding to the body of 
thought on South Carolina’s grievances and proposed remedy, Calhoun also published an 
open letter, remembered as “The Fort Hill Address”, explaining his position. 
In 1832, South Carolina leaders acted upon the nullification theory they had been 
developing for the last two years and nullified the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 they 
believed unconstitutional and detrimental to South Carolina’s interests. This in turn 
sparked a great deal of debate and caused both sides to begin posturing for a violent 
clash. The ultimate resolution of this conflict is of little interest to the current question. 
What matters here is the degree to which the nullifiers, and especially Calhoun as their 
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greatest member, were true to their historical tradition. A careful examination of their 
arguments and position in the context of the history already presented will demonstrate 
that the nullification movement, while novel in the details of its plan, enjoyed the support 
of tradition, precedent, and history. 
Calhoun and South Carolina’s plan of action demonstrates an Althusian and 
decentralized conception of the union. The South Carolina Exhibition, Calhoun argued 
that in the event that the central government exercises powers not granted to it by the 
Constitution, the states may legitimately counter that usurpation of power. This state 
intervention was to be accomplished by a special convention.64 This convention acting as 
the organ of the people of the state could choose to nullify, within the state’s borders, the 
federal act in question. After such a convention, Calhoun propounded that the other states 
may either affirm the act of nullification or affirm the nullified act by amending the 
constitution to explicitly allow for the questioned power.65 This mechanism was how 
Calhoun proposed protecting states from central government usurpation of power.  
Calhoun grounded his nullification doctrine in an Althusian philosophy of the 
state. In his masterwork, A Disquisition on Government, written in the 1840s, he 
expressed his long held belief that man was a social being: 
I assume, as an incontestable fact, that man is so constituted as to be a social 
being. His inclinations and wants, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to 
associate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in any age or 
country, in any state other than the social. In no other, indeed, could he exist; and 
in no other—were it possible for him to exist—could he attain to a full 
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development of his moral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself, in the scale 
of being, much above the level of the brute creation.66 
 
To be in isolation from other humans was an unnatural state. This presupposition led him 
to believe that governments were the creation of societies. Society maintained power over 
the government in this view and never gave up the sovereignty it possessed in delegating 
to government powers necessary to accomplish certain functions for the good of 
society.67 Thus, he held an essentially Althusian conception of the state. In Politica 
Althusius wrote:  
Necessity therefore induces association; and the want of things necessary for life, 
which are acquired and communicated by the help and aid of one’s associates, 
conserves it. For this reason it is evident that the commonwealth, or civil society, 
exists by nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal who strives eagerly for 
association. If however, anyone wishes not to live in society, or needs nothing 
because of his own abundance, he is not considered a part of the 
commonwealth.68  
 
Also in Politica, Althusius asserted “The Public association exists when many private 
associations are linked together for the purpose of establishing an inclusive political 
order.”69 The similarities between Althusius and Calhoun’s position are obvious. Both 
placed sovereignty in organic societies and subjected government to society and its 
interests. This conception of society combined with a belief that the American union was 
a collection of separate peoples each maintaining their own sovereignty made it corollary 
in Calhoun’s thought that any one state may authoritatively counter an action of the 
                                            
66
 John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government in Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy 
of John C. Calhoun, ed. Ross M. Lence, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992), 5.  
 
67
 Ibid., 5-6. John. C. Calhoun, “Speech Introducing Resolutions Declaratory of the Nature and 
Power of the Federal Government in the Senate.” January 22, 1833, 21. 
 
68
 Johannes Althusius, Politica (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), 25.  
 
69
 Ibid., 39.  
THE NULLIFIERS AND HISTORY                                                                              25 
central government. However, he should not be seen as an opponent to popular 
sovereignty. Rather he supported popular sovereignty at the level of the community 
rather than simple majority rule by the entire population of the union. A majority of 
political communities would provide for the protection of community rights, but simple 
majoritarianism allowed for the abuse of minorities too easily and ignored the existence 
and rights of communities.70 
Nationalists viciously attacked this theory. They held that sovereignty resided in 
the people as a whole.71 This view was essentially similar to that expressed by the 
Parliament in the struggle for independence. While different in the trappings, it was a 
Hobbesian conception of the state. Proponents of this centralized position claimed 
Americans were all one people, just as Thomas Whateley had claimed regarding subjects 
of the British Empire. A basic tenet of social contract theory is that once individuals have 
entered into the social compact, no minority may legitimately resist the will of the 
majority.72  Thus, if ultimate power rested in the people as a whole, than the central 
government was supreme and the states were essentially administrative districts of the 
government in Washington, incapable of acting independently against oppressive federal 
actions. Calhoun and the other nullifiers though denied that a single American people 
joined by social contract existed. If, as they argued, the constitution only established a 
strong confederation of several peoples, each maintaining sovereignty within itself, then 
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the central government was merely a creature of the states.73 In such an arrangement the 
states were justified in nullifying acts of the central government that violated the 
Constitution.  
All attempts to settle the question of whether America was constituted by a single 
or by several peoples, and thus discover the answer to that question’s corollary 
implications on state power, began with historical inquiry of the nation’s founding.74 
President Jackson took an ardently nationalistic stance on this issue.75 He issued a formal 
declaration to the people of South Carolina in which he laid out a nationalist 
interpretation of American history. It stated, “the people of the United States formed the 
Constitution, … the terms used in its construction show it to be a government in which 
the people of all the states collectively are represented,” thus implying that there existed a 
single American people.76 Jackson’s understanding of the United States as a single nation 
rather than a confederation stems from his belief that as far back as the colonial period, 
the colonies had viewed themselves as a single nation and had entered into alliances 
together as a unit.77 He believed strongly that the implicit unity of colonial America was 
made explicit by the Constitution and that any attempt at secession or nullification was 
completely illegitimate, as it would require one part of the nation to violate its obligations 
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to the whole.78 Given Jackson’s strongly nationalistic interpretation of the union’s origin, 
he obviously could not allow Calhoun’s doctrines. 
 Among the many other nationalist sources that could be cited Benjamin Romaine 
an attorney and native New Yorker is one of the most interesting since he was a veteran 
of the War for Independence and a prominent New York politician. He expressed views 
similar to Jackson’s, arguing that the states had sought to replace the sovereignty of 
England with a new body during the struggle for Independence, and that the “Whole 
People” was the body upon which such power had come to rest. He also emphasized the 
transition from the Articles of Confederation, which had recognized state power, to the 
Constitution of 1787, which begins, “We The People of the United States.”79 Romaine 
argued that if there had been a common understanding that states had a veto prerogative, 
state Constitutions would mention this power, and since none did, no such power 
existed.80  
 An authority on the historical development of the United States, James Madison 
was likely the nullifier’s loftiest opponent. He did not believe in a single, organic 
American people, but rather that the Constitution had acted as a sort of social contract to 
create a single people for certain purposes out of the separate political communities of the 
several states. However, he believed that this compact left the states independent for 
purposes regarding internal concerns. He believed that nullifiers were attempting to 
redefine the nature of the regime and asserted that the Constitution, and with it the new 
                                            
78
 Jackson, “Proclamation to the People of South Carolina,” 589.  
 
79
 Benjamin Romaine, State Sovereignty and a Certain Dissolution of the Union, 16.   
 
80
 Ibid., 26-27. 
THE NULLIFIERS AND HISTORY                                                                              28 
federal republic, was created not by the states but by the people.81 Madison held that the 
adoption of the Constitution by conventions indicated that the people, not the states, 
established the Constitution; if the states had created the central government, then the 
state legislatures would have ratified the Constitution.82 According to Madison, 
nullification theory was unconstitutional and unnecessary, because the Constitution 
already established a system of arbitration in the judiciary. Essentially, he believed that if 
the nullifiers had their way, the nation would be returned to the unstable and dangerous 
condition it had been in under the Articles.83  
 This nationalistic onslaught did not dissuade the nullifiers, though. Calhoun wrote 
that his nullification doctrine “rest[ed] on facts historically as certain as our revolution 
itself.”84 Nullifiers believed their position regarding sovereignty was consistent with the 
development of the nation from colonial times through the struggle for independence and 
the eventual adoption of the Constitution of 1787. They especially and rightly identified 
with the colonies struggle for independence. Thus, despite the naysaying of many 
influential and powerful individuals, they saw their position as consistent with history 
and tradition. 
This sense of connection with history stretched back at least to the era of the 
struggle for independence. While describing what he believed was the permanent, 
sectional majority that the north had become in Congress, William Harper wrote, 
“propose to the people of the South … that the States and people North of the Potomac 
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and North-West of the Ohio, have right and power to make laws to bind them in all cases 
whatsoever—and they foretell us the duration of … the Union.”85 This was language 
borrowed from the Declaratory Act passed by Parliament in 1766, which declared that 
Parliament had power “to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind 
the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases 
whatsoever.”86 Calhoun also alluded to the Revolution in his phraseology. Speaking of 
nullification, he said it would only be appropriate to resort to nullification if,  “the 
alternative would be submission and oppression on one side, or resistance by force on the 
other.”87 This is the same language employed in the Declaration of the Causes and 
Necessity of Taking Up Arms (1775): “We are reduced to the alternative of choosing an 
unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated minsters, or resistance by force.”88 
By such language these South Carolinians were deliberately identifying with their 
forbears who struggled against parliamentary abuses in the 1760s and 1770s.  
 An analysis of the nullifiers’ argument reveals that the struggle for independence 
provided more than phrases and a surface-level association. Rather, the nullifiers had a 
deep-seated ideological association regarding principles of representation and protection 
with the colonists who threw off British rule. The essence of the colonial argument 
against parliamentary taxation is summed up in The Declaration of Rights of the Stamp 
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Act Congress (1765): “That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the 
undoubted rights of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on them, but with their 
own consent, given personally, or by their representatives.”89 The right to no taxation 
without representation recognized that if an interested party was not acting as 
representative, then there was nothing to prevent abusive taxation that would endanger 
liberty.  
Similarly, Calhoun stated, “It is a fundamental political principle, that the power 
to protect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their 
responsible agents.”90 He observed that the majority shapes and entirely controls the 
federal government because the majority either directly or indirectly elects every member 
of the government.91 Thus, the central government, if dominated by a permanent 
majority, did not qualify as a protective institution since it was not in the central 
government’s interest to protect the minority. Essentially, if instead of sharing common 
cause with their constituents, “protectors” stood to benefit by an exploitation of their 
charge, then disregard for rights could be expected. There is a common thread to these 
two assertions. Both demand representation of the people in the affairs of government by 
agents having common interests with their constituents. 
Calhoun and many other southerners were convinced that the north had in fact 
become a permanent sectional majority and therefore the federal government was unable 
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to protect the south’s rights.92 Though the colonists literally had no representatives in 
Parliament and southerners did have representation in Congress, the same principle 
inspired the nullifiers that animated the founders. Just as the colonists could not be taxed 
without representation, the south could not be protected without representation, and since 
southerners were a permanent minority, they were in essence unrepresented in what was 
supposed to be a protective body. Thus nullifiers saw themselves as having common 
cause, that of being un-represented with the Patriots of Seventy-Six.  
Clyde Wilson, professor emeritus at the University of South Carolina and editor 
of The Papers of John C. Calhoun, observes the similarity between the situation of the 
colonists’ struggle for independence and the perceived situation of South Carolinians. He 
notes that Robert Turnbull convinced South Carolinians that they were being oppressed 
by the central government; by oppression he meant “the taking from the citizens of what 
was theirs by abuse of the authority that was delegated for the purpose of protecting the 
citizens in the enjoyment of what was theirs.” He notes that the same belief motivated 
Americans to pursue independence in response to a “trifling tax.”93 Speaking of South 
Carolinians’ belief in their own oppression, Wilson states, “This was exactly the kind of 
situation in which tradition called upon freemen to resist.”94 Just as their forefathers  
faced unjust taxation at the hands of a distant power and thrown off the burden in an 
effort to preserve liberty from power, South Carolinians roused themselves to counter this 
intrusion of their sovereignty and danger to their liberty and prosperity. Thus the 
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nullifiers acted consistently with historical precedent when they, believing themselves to 
be oppressed by a legislative body in which they were essentially not represented, took 
steps to protect their liberties and sovereignty.  
Issues of protection and representation were inherently interwoven with the 
broader contest between Hobbesian and Althusian conceptions of the constitution. The 
Nullifiers were well aware of the similarity between their situation and that of their 
forbears in the Revolution era. Their sense of connection to their history was both a 
motivation of their actions and the source of many of their most compelling arguments 
against the nationalists. Thus no matter the accusation, this republican theory must be 
treated as a legitimate option to be tested rather than a mere chimera invented to meet 
selfish ends. There is the simple and incontrovertible fact that as of the 1770s thirteen 
distinct political communities existed in what would become the United States. During 
the colonial era, these communities had never been a single entity either politically or 
culturally.95  
There is also plenty of room within the historical record to support the position 
that these separate political communities of the colonies had never been merged into a 
single political community throughout the founding era. The Declaration of 
Independence did not indicate a common nationality as some argued but rather “the new 
states were only united in the sense of an informal and non-legally binding collaboration 
meant to achieve various common goals such as fighting for and recognizing their 
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sovereign independence.”96 In the 18th century all nouns were still capitalized, and the 
Declaration capitalized “States” but not “united.” Thus “united” was an adjective 
describing the newly independent states’ solidarity in opposing their common foe, 
England.97 As completely independent nations the states would have of course exercised 
full sovereignty at this time.  
The Articles of Confederation was the first legally binding combination of the 
states. However, it scrupulously maintained the sovereignty of each member. Article II 
stated: “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, 
Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the 
United Sates, in Congress Assembled.”98 Hayworth notes that the listing the name of 
each state in the document indicates that this was viewed as an international treaty 
amongst independent nations.99 The nullifiers had a great deal of historical evidence from 
the struggle for independence to support their belief that sovereignty resided in the people 
of the several states.  
Informed by this perception of American development, Calhoun believed that the 
Constitution of 1787 had not changed the nature of the states nor their relation to each 
other. He held that since the states preceded the central government, it “was created by 
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their [the states’] agency.”100 He expressly rejected the idea that the states had forged 
themselves into a single nation by ratifying the Constitution, since the convention 
deliberately rejected the term “National” for the title of the Constitution and kept the 
terminology of “United States.”101 Tracing the employment of the name “United States of 
America” through the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and 
the Constitution of 1787, he stated, “The retention of the same style, throughout every 
stage of their existence, affords strong, if not conclusive evidence that the political 
relation between these States, under their present constitution and government, is 
substantially the same as under the confederacy and revolutionary government.” 102 Also, 
he believed “the changes made by the present Constitution were not in the foundation but 
in the superstructure of the system.”103 Calhoun’s interpretation of the historical fact that 
the Constitution was ratified by state conventions differed significantly from Madison’s. 
Whereas Madison and other nationalists believed that these conventions evidenced 
ratification by the people as a whole, Calhoun put great emphasis upon the fact that they 
were held at the state level. This meant to him that the people of the several states, the 
same authority that had called the state government into existence, had given their 
consent to the federal government.104  
This last point is important in its details as it is often misunderstood and thought 
to be a critical weakness in Calhoun’s theory. An insufficiently careful reading of 
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Calhoun’s position can lead one to believe that he argued that the state governments had 
created the central government as they had under the Articles of Confederation; it seems 
Madison may have had this misunderstanding.105 Contributing to this conclusion is that 
the compact theory of the union, in positing that the states created the union, can sound 
very much like a simple confederacy, and indeed Calhoun regularly referred to the union 
with such terminology. The fact that the people had in fact given sovereignty directly to 
the central government was often proffered as a rebuttal of Calhoun’s theory that a single 
state could nullify a federal law. However, Calhoun never asserted that the state 
government and not the people had created the central government.  Rather, he affirmed 
the sovereignty of the people in creating the central government: “The people of the 
States have, indeed, delegated a portion of their sovereignty, to be exercised conjointly by 
a General Government, and have retained the residue to be exercised by their respective 
States Governments.”106 On those occasions when Calhoun spoke of the States creating 
the government he meant the people of the states, the true political community that is the 
state, not the internal government each community established. If the union were a simple 
confederacy, the state governments would have created the central government; however, 
his recognition that the people directly invested authority in the central government when 
they called it into being brings him closer to the Madisonian doctrine of split sovereignty.  
Where Madison and Calhoun differ is not in their positions on the source of 
authority but rather on the effect the Constitution had upon the sovereignty of the people. 
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Madison believed that the Constitution created out of the several peoples, a single people 
for “certain purposes.” Thus a single state could not nullify a national law, because it was 
not the entire sovereign people that had created the union.107 Calhoun maintained that the 
people of each state, in imparting authority to the central government and entering into a 
pact with peoples of other states, had never surrendered their individual identity to 
become part of a corporate whole. Therefore, each state never lost its individual 
sovereignty: “to delegate is not to part with or to impair power. The delegated power in 
the agent is as much the power of the principal as if it remained in the latter, and may, as 
between him and his agent be controlled or resumed at pleasure.”108 Against the idea that 
the Constitution itself had created a single people, he stated: 
No such community ever existed as the people of the United States, forming a 
collective body of individuals in one nation; and the idea that they are so untied 
by the present Constitution as a social compact, as alleged by the proclamation, is 
utterly false and absurd. To call the Constitution the social compact, is the 
greatest possible abuse of language. No two things are more dissimilar; there is 
not an expression in the whole science of politics, more perfectly definite in its 
meaning than the social compact. It means that association of individuals, 
founded on the implied assent of all its members, which precedes all Government, 
and from which Government or the constitutional compact springs.109 
 
Calhoun’s conception of the nature of a social compact made it impossible to suppose 
that the Constitution was the social compact creating a single American people. Clearly, 
Calhoun and the nullifiers were correct in their understanding of the historical source of 
the central government’s power—elsewise Madison was also wrong.  The differences 
between the Father of the Constitution and Calhoun were thus on technical questions of 
political science and the definitions of constitution and social contract. These are 
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questions that simple historical inquiry cannot answer. What historical analysis does 
show us though, is that Calhoun’s edifice of political science rested upon a sold historical 
foundation. 
The above observations do not exhaust the historical incidents Calhoun cited in 
defense of his position. He noted that North Carolina and Rhode Island had refused to 
ratify the Constitution till much later than the other states and for a time were considered 
independent, foreign nations.110 If the people as a whole had ratified the Constitution then 
even those states that had not ratified would have been compelled to join the union. Since 
this historically was not the case, though, nullifiers believed that the states had 
maintained sovereignty even under the Constitution of 1787. The fact that Virginia, New 
York, and Rhode Island had provisions for secession in their ratification bills also 
supports Calhoun’s belief that the states had maintained sovereignty.111 Calhoun’s theory 
was not as radical as some believed; it flowed logically from certain premises that were 
historically verifiable.  
The nullifiers also saw their doctrine as being in the vein of Jeffersonian 
Republicanism, rather than as a radical diversion from precedent. William Harper 
appealed to Madison’s Report of 1799.112 The Report stated that sovereignty resided in 
the people of the several states. It defined a state as “the people composing those political 
societies, in their highest sovereign capacity” and declared, “the Constitution was 
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submitted to the ‘states,’ … the ‘states’ ratified it; and, … they are consequently parties 
to the compact, from which the powers of the federal government result.”113 Harper 
esteemed Jefferson even higher than Madison, calling Jefferson the “master” of “a true 
and thorough comprehension of the genius and working of our confederate system.”114 In 
the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson expressed ideas incredibly similar to those espoused 
by nullifiers: 
…Where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of 
the act is the rightful remedy: that every State has a natural right… to nullify of 
their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits: that 
without this right they would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of 
whosoever might exercise this right of judgment for them: … [the States] alone 
being parties to the compact, and solely authorized to judge the last resort of the 
powers exercised under it, Congress being not a party, but merely the creature of 
the compact, and subject as to its assumptions of power to the final judgment of 
those by whom, and for whose use itself and its powers were all created and 
modified…115 
In the same document the Kentucky Legislature declared the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
“not law, but … altogether void and of no force.”116 Here was the same idea of 
sovereignty expressed by the nullifiers.117  
Calhoun not only found justification for his position in these documents, he 
believed a general and great constitutional crisis was already underway due to an 
abandonment of the doctrines propounded in them. On January 12, 1833, he wrote to 
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Bolling Hall, a former Representative form Georgia, “ Never did I dream that I would 
live to see a change so great and deplorable. The Constitution is a dead letter; and in its 
place is substituted the will of an unchecked, unlimited and interested majority.”118 The 
next day he wrote to Samuel D. Ingham a former Secretary of the Treasury:  
Who can look at this great and growing country, and not weep to see it sinking 
into the lowest stage of political degeneracy? The fault is not with the people. 
They are honest, industrious, intelligent and patriotic. It is to be found in our 
departure from the great republican principles of [17]98; and thereby practically 
converting our confederative system into a great consolidated government, 
without limitation of powers or constitutional check.119  
 
Calhoun expressed the belief that the nation had experienced a similar crisis in the 1790s 
and believed the American experiment would have failed long before had not the election 
of Jefferson set things to right. Calhoun said, “ But the time had at length come when we 
are required to decide whether this shall be a confederacy any longer, or whether it shall 
give way to a consolidated Government.”120 He believed that a reassertion of the 
sovereignty and separateness – which he believed to be expressed in the Virginia and 
Kentucky resolutions – of the several states was necessary to the preservation of the 
liberty of the nation. Thus, not only did the nullifiers find support for their position in the 
history of the nation’s founding but also in more recent history and republican tradition.   
Madison was repulsed and disturbed however, to see his name brandished as an 
authoritative propounder of the nullifiers’ position. His positions on political issues in the 
1790s as a Democratic Republican party leader and especially his statements in the 
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Virginia Resolutions of 1798 seemed to indicate that he was a supporter of the same 
positions as the Nullifiers. However, Madison is a sort of enigma. Contrasting with some 
of his incredibly states’ rights positions, he was ardently nationalist during the creation 
and adoption of the Constitution of 1787 and again in the 1830s in response to 
Nullification doctrine. This apparent undulation on Constitutional issues is a dominant 
theme in Madisonian historiography. Many have found Madison to be at least 
fundamentally consistent in his stance on these issues, but the historical community has 
yet to reach consensus on this point.121  
It is even harder to judge whether Jefferson would have actually supported such 
policies because unlike Madison, he had died before his name was invoked by the 
nullifiers and thus was unable to weigh in himself. Madison attempted to save his friend 
from accusations of supporting such policies, but John Quincy Adams did indeed see him 
as responsible for the nullification doctrine.122 He explicitly wrote to Edward Everett, 
“Jefferson was the father of South Carolina Nullification, which points directly to the 
dissolution of the union.”123 Not only did Jefferson appear to support strong states rights 
doctrines in the Kentucky Resolution, but also late in life he had written letters to 
Governor Giles of Virginia in which he spoke of secession from the union as a viable 
option in cases of extreme need. In fairness to Jefferson he also stated within the same 
                                            
121
 For an overview of Madisonian historiography dealing with his consistency and nationalism 
see, Alan Gibson, “The Madisonian Madison and the Question of Consistency: The Significance and 
Challenge of Recent Research,” The Review of Politics 64, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 311. Kevin Gutzman’s 
James Madison and the Making of America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012) is the strongest recent 
representation of scholarship asserting contradictions in Madison’s positions.   
 
122
 Drew McCoy, The Last of the Fathers, 143-147. 
 
123
 John Quincy Adams to Edward Everett, Charlestown, October 10, 1836, in Ralph L. Ketcham 
and John Quincy Adams, “Jefferson and Madison and the Doctrines of Interposition and Nullification: A 
Letter of John Quincy Adams, “The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 66, no. 2 (Apr. 1958): 
182.  
THE NULLIFIERS AND HISTORY                                                                              41 
letter that “the States should be watchful to note every material usurpation on their rights 
… to protest against them as wrongs to which our present submission shall be considered, 
not as acknowledgments or precedents of right, but as a temporary yielding to the lesser 
evil, until their accumulation shall overweigh that of separation.”124 This suggests that 
perhaps such a protest is what he envisioned the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions to 
be. However, this is not certain, especially considering the strong language of those 
documents. Jefferson’s statements in this letter, while leaving no doubt that he thought 
secession legitimate in extreme circumstances, leave open the possibility that he thought 
of secession not as a constitutional right, but as an undeniable natural right integrally 
related to the natural right to rebellion. If the latter was his intention, Jefferson was in 
essential agreement with Madison on this topic.125 His talk of enduring usurpation with 
peaceful protest seems to weaken claims the nullifiers have on him as a supporter of their 
doctrine. 
  However, despite the outright denunciation of Madison and the questionability of 
Jefferson’s support, the nullifiers were not out of order to believe the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions and Reports supported their position. If nothing else, the premises 
of those documents and Calhoun’s theory of Nullification were the same at least in so far 
that they held to a compact nature of the union. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
expressed the same Althusian conception Jefferson had argued for in The Summary View 
of the Rights of British America and ensured that such conceptions were firmly carried 
into the national period. The structure of the premises and arguments of the documents of 
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‘98 left room for an honest interpreter to come to Calhoun’s conclusions from them.126 In 
that Madison, Jefferson, and Calhoun all started with the same foundational historical 
facts, the nullifiers’ reliance on the Spirit of ‘98 was reasonable and legitimately added a 
degree of historical support to their position even if it only provided an authoritative 
refutation of the sort of nationalism that claimed the people of the United States formed 
the nation as a single people.  
 In the early 1830s Calhoun summarized the entire nature of the question before 
the United States when he stated, “Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, 
whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a 
government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the States, or on the 
unrestrained will of a majority…”127 As demonstrated, this position was grounded in a 
political theory fundamentally different from that of the unitary political theory of 
nationalists. That the same dichotomy of political theory between the Hobbesian and 
Althusian state existed in the 1760s and 1770s demonstrates a continuity of this struggle 
between dispersed and consolidated political theories in American politics. This obvious 
chain releases the nullifiers from accusations of being mere reactionaries and places them 
in the same tradition as Jefferson and the American Revolution.  
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